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Abstract
Especially since 1990s when capital flows liberalization took their intensive 
course, also the literature on foreign direct investment and respectfully cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions grew. On the other hand, although it was accompanying 
these processes, foreign divestment attracted much less attention. Speculating about 
the reasons for such situation, one could stress that following the nature of the 
balance of payments logic foreign direct divestment was not expected. Nevertheless, 
these processes were present. This chapter addresses some of the most important 
impacts of foreign direct investment that had been a subject to inverse processes 
later. The authors try to confront the drivers of these processes and search for differ-
ent patterns obviously often deriving outside economic rationale from the position 
of a developed market economy. Using their expertize the authors connected con-
crete findings of their study with possible drivers of divestment. According to the 
finding the common nominator was mixed success with the transition in transition 
countries.
Keywords: foreign direct investment, foreign direct divestment, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, economic effects, host economy
1. Introduction
There are several studies showing the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on domestic economies. Typically, studies find that inward FDI are sup-
porting several areas of basic importance for host economy growth. Different 
authors put focus on different areas. First there is FDI support of access to 
modern technology and financial sector development - references [1, 2]. More 
microeconomic oriented studies found that FDI typically promotes productivity 
growth of an acquired firm - references [3, 4]. Macroeconomic oriented studies 
on the other hand bring forth FDI positive effects for the growth potential of the 
host economy as well as for knowledge transfer, growing engagement of local 
suppliers in supply chains, additional tax revenues and the better use of local 
services and infrastructure [5–9].
Bringing in more literature sources will provide results referring to positive 
effects of FDI for technology development, savings, investments and economic 
development and growth [10]. Furthermore FDI should promote openness to 
changes, improve leadership and new advanced technology [11]. According to [12] 
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FDI is exposed not just as a tool for increasing productivity, but also for fostering 
human capital development and strengthening corporate institutions.
FDI can also reduce unemployment, increase engagement of local companies in 
supplier and subcontractor networks, support development strategies of individual 
sectors, increase development potential of the economy, and develop managerial 
knowledge skills [13–15].
However, it is also proven that the benefits of FDI are not self-evident and that 
the economic effect of identical FDI can bring very different results in different 
countries as well as industries [16–18]. Relevant for the topic of this chapter is that 
proved that positive effects of FDI are not resulting in an equal effect in all branches 
and industries, with the same frequency and intensity. As presented by [9] the 
positive effects of FDI depend on the readiness of the host country to openness, and 
appear only after a certain period.
It is proved that the benefits from FDI increase in an open investment environ-
ment. In countries with macroeconomic stability, democratic investment regime, 
privatization, active competition policies, and deregulation.
However, with unfavorable conditions negative effects of FDI can occur. 
Reference [19] proved that FDI caused the reduction of productivity in the host 
country. Further FDI can reduce employment, increase concentration in the 
domestic market and even more it can cause the closing of domestic companies.
According to [9] FDI can lead to shrinking of the domestic stock market, 
anti-competitive reactions of the acquired firms, or even elimination of the 
domestic competition in the home market. [15] proved that one of the main threat 
of FDI during the last years is related to the fear of losing the national sovereignty 
and autonomy of the host country and consequently losing control of strategic 
industries.
Especially since 1990s when capital flows liberalization took their intensive 
course, also the literature on FDI and respectfully cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (C-B M&A) grew. Although it was accompanying these processes, on 
the other hand, divestment attracted much less attention. Speculating about the 
reason for such situation, one could stress that following the nature of balance of 
payments logic the FDI to take an inverse course was not expected. With the theory 
arising already in 1980s [16], these processes were present and have been gaining on 
importance in later decades [17].
As foreign divestment, authors will consider reduction of assets of foreign 
investor in the receiving country. Authors will not discuss foreign divestment on the 
basis of management decisions such as changing or concentrating to core business 
of majority owner, change in the market positions or instability in the host country, 
poor performance and management, but will focus rather on vague field of general 
FDI acceptance in a host economy.
Authors will try to find the position of foreign divestment by the help of the data 
acquired by study on economic effects of C-B M&A carried out by the authors in 
the period between 2005 and 2015. Having certain information and experience on 
economies of Western Balkans authors will try to synthesize information of general 
attitude towards market economy and democratic development.
In this chapter, authors first summarize the results of their studies in the period 
between 2002 and 2015 proving predominantly positive economic effects of C-B 
M&A. Second part of the chapter brings the facts discussed in the literature, 
showing that the important part of FDI had been also subject to inverse processes 
later. Authors try to confront the drivers of these processes and search for different 
patterns obviously often deriving outside economic rationale from the position of a 
developed market economy.
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2. Why it happened?
Basing on the theoretical paradigm of liberal concept of the balance of payments 
it seemed plausible that the study measuring economic effect of this form of FDI 
would prove the positive acceptance and sentiments of stakeholders in receiving 
countries. The result of authors’ studies carried out in the period between 2005 
and 2015 show that C-B M&A, despite some reservations in the literature [18–21], 
support the receiving country technological improvement and exports.
Nevertheless, at the same time also processes of divestment were taking place. 
According to [22] multinational enterprises divested one of every five foreign-
owned affiliates over this period of time.
In the following text authors will discuss the possible reasons for divestment and 
will try to locate the factors that were not taken into account with authors´ study 
that have proved drivers of divestment sentiment.
In the last quarter of 2020 new developments in the EU saw Poland and Hungary 
opposing the present EU Commission threat that due to issues with (un)democratic 
processes in these countries (with Slovenia under present government also checking 
for feasibility of such course) they could be expelled from a massive economic help 
from the EU. This simply showed that the countries that would be beneficiaries of 
processes of widening of western-type democracy might have changed their view 
after being accepted in this noble community for which they longed for decades. 
No one could conclude that with pledging for acceptance in the EU the politicians 
as well as opinion creators were rather thinking on higher wages, access to western 
goods and free movement (until it suits them). Their perspective seemed to be 
biased towards higher standard of living without endeavor to catch up with their 
missing or interrupted path to a modern democratic society. The same is actually 
valid for the process of liberalization of capital imports. Rather than doing their 
homework with institutional setting and economic environment (financial mar-
kets, meritocracy, public finance transparency and accountability) which could 
assure FDI best contribution to the incoming countries economy, they seemingly 
expected (were allegedly promised) manna from heaven and are now claiming that 
it was rather Dans’ fake gifts.
If we turn the side of the medal, we could probably conclude that there is 
another factor preventing host countries to be more effective with adjustment of 
their economic environment to the reality of liberal capital flows. The conditions 
in which they are supposed to open and develop their economies differ very much 
from the conditions that today’s leading economic powers had in the time of their 
positioning as such. It is not difficult to conclude that the present domination of 
western economic model and technology was actually achieved through all kinds 
of their interventionism in favor of domestic economies. These were the times 
following first industrial revolution. Only when established as leading economies 
they became promotors of trade and capital flows liberalization. They are actually 
doing their best to impose liberal order to those, which would surely benefit from 
certain interventionism. The problem is that due to arrears in their (democratic and 
institutional) development they are not in position to carry out such policies against 
foreign competition without the risk of being expelled from the international trade 
community facing the negative consequences for their economic development 
and growth.
Foreign divestment must therefore be seen as a sign that with international 
integration and globalization also process of international economic disintegration 
is taking course. Opposing the dissolvent of their culture and tradition, the fol-
lower countries (countries not in first line of systemic leaders of global technology 
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progress) no doubt have support of domestic electoral body. The solution is surely 
not to be find in the present economic and international co-operation model.
It needs no special proof, that “Asian tigers” have taken a different path in 
response to liberal capitalism. According to [23] the list of countries with highest 
average intelligence quotient is topped by Singapore, China, Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan. Being on the top by the (unpopular) criteria of intelligence 
quotient these societies under democratic or less democratic environments obvi-
ously succeeded with adjusting of their cultural model to the mainstream dictated 
by western industrial countries. Up to now, nothing else could be said apart from 
that, that they supply a clear proof that in favorable conditions FDI supports host 
country economic growth, employment, technology improvement and interna-
tional competitiveness.
3. The facts deriving from author’s studies
As stressed above authors base the findings on the results of their study in the 
period between 2005 and 2015, researching European economies that were divided 
in developed and transition countries and separately the ones of Slovenia and 
Serbia.
In the research of European economies in total 53 answers from developed 
countries and 38 from transition countries were analyzed. As developed countries 
old EU members before 2004 EU enlargement, Island, Norway and Switzerland 
were considered. Although there are considerable differences among them, these 
countries have been experiencing western type of democracy, private ownership 
and market economy. They are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Island, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. On the other side as transition countries con-
sidered were European countries, who after World War II shared state ownership, 
mono-party system and central planning. Authors presupposed that these heritages 
should define a different need for privatization, to replace obsolete capacities 
in manufacturing and to develop markets and hierarchies typical for a market 
economy – all being normal consequences of inward C-B M&As. The countries 
representing this group were: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia and Montenegro.
The results pointing to possible sentiments for foreign divestment on the side of 
receiving countries are stressed below.
We start with receiving countries motivation for attracting C-B M&A.
As shown in the Table 1 the most important motives for attracting C-B M&A 
were the access to new markets, followed by the transition process, know-how 
transfer and technology improvements. External pressure on domestic policies as 
well as C-B M&A as a support for a better strategy of industry development did not 
attract much attention in relation to the motives of C-B M&A.
The attitude of expanding national economies, compared to transitional econo-
mies, where capital imports have the function of repairing domestic structural 
disproportions is shown with giving the higher importance to access to new markets 
in developed countries compared with the ranking in transition countries.
National competitiveness and the importance of development local management 
skills, have been considered more important motive for attracting C-B M&A in 
transition countries than in developed countries because the situation of catching 
up in this field is logically more present in transition countries.
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Answers also show that technology improvement is important motive for 
attracting C-B M&A in all countries. While in transition countries technology 
improvement closes the gap towards developed countries, in developed countries it 
is basically there for consolidation of strategic industries.
Being less motivated for entrance of foreign markets transition countries typi-
cally demonstrate themselves as closed economies in the period before the start 
of 1990s. Lagging behind developed countries transition countries surprisingly 
demonstrate that they are not as they should be convinced that the C-B M&A are 
also about the transition from closed economy into an open market economy.
One would also expect that meeting the western standards through C-B M&A 
would represent higher priority to execute external pressure on domestic politics to 
accomplish transition processes in transition countries.
Authors also analyzed possible threats of C-B M&A for domestic economies. 
Results are presented in the Table 2.
As it can be seen from the Table 2 shrinking of domestic stock market was 
assessed as the lowest threat of C-B M&A in all receiving countries, while 
crowding-out of domestic industries was the highest threat for C-B M&A receiving 
countries.
The Table 2 also shows that apart from ‘crowding-out of domestic companies’ 
where there was a relatively small difference between both groups of countries, 
other answers show quite different perspectives when assessing C-B M&A threats.
The risk of reduction in employment and decrease of competition in the home 
market were considered essentially larger threats in developed countries than in 
transition countries. Such sentiments could derive from conviction, which may be 
the ground for the real policy of preventing takeover bids in European developed 
countries: takeovers of ‘national champions’ may cause destabilization of labour 
markets. The problem of unemployment reduction because of C-B M&A is present 
in transition countries too but in a smaller extent, probably because C-B M&A have 
established themselves as one of the tools of privatization and economic restructur-
ing, which must take place anyway.
However, in transition countries more focus is given on low pricing of sold 
assets and undermining of the domestic economic development strategy. These 
two threats received more attention in transition countries because of the huge 
restructuring that C-B M&A cause in this environment endangers the last positive 
illusions of the domestic economic development model and ‘national champions’ 
that survived the transitional process. And there is no doubt, that when they are 
Motivation factor Developed countries Transition countries
External pressure on domestic politics 5,82% 7,84%
Development of local management skills 4,58% 7,84%
Lack of strategy for certain industries development 6,87% 7,84%
Part of transition process 17,46% 15,69%
Access to new market 23,50% 16,67%
Technology improvement 13,74% 12,75%




Grounds for countries’ motivation when attracting C-B M&A.
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sufficiently scarce and unique, domestic assets signify a special incentive for foreign 
investors, which is then expected to be offset correspondingly in their selling price.
Threats of crowding-out and undermining competition through inward C-B 
M&A were subject to a more detailed analysis with the help of additional ques-
tions requiring detailed information on the matter. It was of special interest to us 
that through these questions a possible difference between expectations (threats) 
and experience (the cases that the respondents have registered) would arise. We 
have chosen the two items mentioned above, as it was expected that they would be 
ranked high with threats of inward C-B M&A.
In the Table 2 above the case could be supported through the fear that C-B 
M&A could undermine domestic economic strategy. It should be clear that import-
ing foreign capital should be a part of national strategy, while functioning of 
these investments by themselves should be treated as a step in the right direction. 
Without entering the reasons for such sentiment this conviction becomes relevant 
as soon these threats enter the domestic policy discussion with domestic critics 
of transition itself and trade unions. In this way, it influences politics’ sentiment 
towards C-B M&A making it harder to the foreign investors to pursue their initial 
business goals and could thus pave the way for divestment.
As it can be seen in the Table 3 the market structures in developed countries as 
being far more developed than those in transition countries, are obviously offering 
less chance to foreign affiliates to act in an anticompetitive way.
Similarly, to above risk of creating hostile environment for C-B M&A poses also 
the sentiment of anticompetitive behavior that was already experienced. It is surely 
difficult to judge when harsh competition for domestic companies was caused by 
the practice, normal in the West or when real anticompetitive practice was at work. 
This sentiment has otherwise to do with lagging institutional reforms – here in the 
field of competition policy.
Authors also examined professionals’ assessment of media attitude towards 
inward C-B M&A. Results are presented in the Table 4.
Probable the strongest case for also existing sentiments, which may also curb 
divestment makes pretty inverse treatment of C-B M&A in media when considering 
two groups of host countries. In the Table 4 above it is shown that C-B M&A were 
treated more favorably in developed countries, because inward C-B M&A in devel-
oped countries obviously face a highly developed social and economic environment 
with more consistent markets and financial structures and are therefore accepted 
more friendly in media. Further, in developed countries it is expected that they 
could neutralize their possible negative effects of C-B M&A more than transition 
countries and this can also lead to less public skepticism.
Threat Developed countries TRansition countries
Shrinking of domestic stock market 3,09% 5,88%
Crowding-out of domestic industries 25,77% 28,24%
Undermining of domestic economic 
development strategy
5,15% 12,94%
Low pricing of sold assets 7,22% 16,47%
Decrease of competition in the home market 20,62% 14,12%
Reduction of employment 38,14% 22,35%
Source: [24].
Table 2. 
Threats of C-B M&A.
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The authors performed similar research by comparison of sentiments towards 
C-B M&A of local communities in Slovenia and in Serbia [25]. Authors were inter-
ested in the comparison between local communities in Slovenia and Serbia and they 
wanted to analyze the consequences of different approach with accepting change 
and especially international opening.
When analyzing C-B M&A threats also here results relevant for this chapter 
appeared. First interestingly with some threats Slovenian critical sentiments 
towards C-B M&A were exposed surprisingly stronger than in Serbia, regarding the 
fact that Slovenia is often considered as one of the champions of transition. They 
refer to possible reduction of employment and environmental damage, the last 
being nevertheless a sign of higher development level.
In the same article the explanation for such outcome is explained with the fact 
that at the beginning of the transition processes in Eastern Europe Slovenia was 
according to Economic development clear leader. This perception, however, often 
harmed political will to change causing arrears especially in institutional transition 
and was also off set in lower acceptance of foreign capital [25].
Otherwise, as expected the differences pointing at possible sentiments to sup-
port divestment are in favor of Slovenian local municipalities. So, in Serbia typically 
the public seems to be convinced that Serbian companies have been acquired for too 
low price and that foreigners could exercise unwanted influence on the local level.
To a certain extend these results coincide with the results of already mentioned 
study by [22]. As possible drivers of divestment sentiments here among others 
through statistical significance unit labour costs, trade openness, level of control of 
corruption labour market efficiency and environmental policy stringency was proved.
4. Conclusion
This chapter shows the summary of the results of the research [24, 25] done in 
European countries and separately in Serbia and Slovenia. Main positive effects as 
Anticompetitive behavior by foreign affiliates Developed countries Transition countries
It has happened in several cases 11,32% 23,68%
There have been some cases when it happened 41,51% 60,53%
There have not been such behavior 47,17% 15,79%
Source: [24].
Table 3. 
Anticompetitive behavior by foreign affiliates.
General treatment of C-B M&A in media Developed countries Transition countries
Favorable 1,89% 0%
Showing acceptance 32,08% 13,16%
Neutral 43,40% 44,74%




General treatment of C-B M&A in the media.
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well as some threats of C-B M&A are presented. Special attention is given also to 
the media treatment of C-B M&A in European countries and as an important part 
of the FDI had been a subject to inverse processes later authors tried to connect the 
results of their research done in the past to these processes.
Using their expertize the authors connected concrete findings of their study 
with possible drivers of divestment – those coming from the policy and public senti-
ment in host countries were considered here. According to the findings the common 
nominator was mixed success with the transition process in transition countries. It 
proved that it would be a gap in institutional transition that prevented connection 
with interests of foreign investors and host country.
The results of comparison of economic effects in developed and transition coun-
tries actually enabled the insight into possible drivers of divestment. It is plausible 
to conclude that economic effects were focused to the beginning of transactions, 
while the era of investment operation dissonances could later lead to climate favor-
able to divestment.
For this chapter highly relevant are also findings in the source [26] that in 
respect to institutional distance the chances for foreign divestment are subject to 
an inverse U curve. This would mean that parting from lower institutional distance 
these chances grow, reach their peak on the border outskirts of certain institutional 
setting arrangements and lower when the institutional distance is bigger. Applied 
geographically this would be the case, which could be expected for an investor 
from European industrial economy. Here lower chances for foreign divestment 
would refer to neighboring economies and would reach their peak on the bordering 
belt economies – here meaning the economies of Western Balkans. Going further 
the Asian economies which we use as example of Asian Tigers have quite different 
institutional setting and thus institutional distance to the investor’s country. Due 
to other factors mainly explainable with their flexibility the chances of foreign 
divestment should be reduced.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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